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NOTES ON A BICENTENNIAL 
CONSTITUTION: PART I, 
PROCESSES OF CHANGEt 
William Van Alstyne* 
I. INTRODUCTION: SIGNIFICANCE, LONGEVITY, AND CHANGE 
There are nearly 160 nations today with written constitutions, yet 
fewer than half of these written constitutions predate 1970. Moreover, if 
one retraces three decades prior to 1970, say, prior to World War II, the 
number of written constitutions retaining substantially the same basic 
features to the present time dwindles to a mere fifteen. Of these fifteen 
constitutions, only five were also extant in 1900. Written constitutions 
seem to be a relatively recent phenomenon. Long-lasting written consti-
tutions, moreover, may be rare. 1 
Four of the five extant written constitutions that predate 1900 be-
long to Colombia, Luxemburg, Argentina, and Norway. The earliest of 
these four is Norway's, dating from 1815. The fifth, the oldest by far, 
dates from 1789. It belongs to the United States. Indeed, ours is the 
oldest, continuously functioning, and basically unaltered written consti-
tution in the world. Even allowing for some obvious natural advantages 
we have had, the unique longevity of this fundamentally unaltered con-
stitution is surely noteworthy. 
Shortly we are to commemorate the bicentennial of our constitution 
and, given its superannuated distinction, no doubt much will be written 
in praise of its great virtues. Still, it is easier to assume what these virtues 
are than it is to specify their critical value. We tend to forget, for in-
stance, that even the fact that the constitution is written is not necessarily 
critical. After all, the English have maintained quite a stable government 
since 1688, with an excellent tradition of freedom, and to this day the 
English still manage without benefit of a written constitution. 
If it is not the bare fact of a long-lived written constitution that war-
rants praise, perhaps it is the critical value of our famous Bill of Rights 
that we should stress. To be sure, its own bicentennial is not due until 
t An abbreviated version of this article was delivered at the University of Illinois College of 
Law, February 20. 1984, as the first 1983-1984 lecture of the David C. Baum Memorial Lectures on 
Civil Liberties and Civil Rights. The author intends to write several other related essays connecting 
this article to other bicentennial themes. 
• Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
I. These and other interesting comparisons are briefly noted in Grier, It's Tough to Write a 
Constitution that will Endure, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 19, 1983, at 2, co1s. 2-4. 
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1991, and, strictly speaking, the English have also managed without a 
formal Bill of Rights. But at least our Bill of Rights may sharply distin-
guish us from the more totalitarian communist countries in which such 
basic matters have presumably been ignored. Perhaps, then, it is this 
feature of our written constitution that we should most celebrate. 
Perhaps that is so, but perhaps we should be somewhat careful in 
the claims we make and the comparisons we mean to draw as well. 
Otherwise we may merely embarrass ourselves by our claims. Our as-
sumptions about the nature of written constitutions in communist coun-
tries may turn out to be false. Indeed, so far as the most prominent of 
those countries is concerned, the suggestion that our constitution is supe-
rior to theirs because ours provides an elaborate Bill of Rights and their 
constitution provides no equivalent Bill of Rights, is quite absurd. 
Actually, the 1977 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics (USSR) has a list of rights that makes our own list seem pale and 
incomplete. 2 The Soviet Constitution does not merely guarantee such 
things as privacy,3 freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly,4 
religion, 5 petition,6 and freedom from arbitrary arrest.7 It also provides 
an explicit equal rights article, 8 of the very sort that failed in the United 
States as recently as 1982, with the demise of the proposed twenty-sev-
enth amendment, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The Constitu-
tion of the USSR also contains, as ours does not, a long list of affirmative 
rights: to health protection,9 to housing, 10 to education, 11 and to workY 
This new Constitution of 1977 is the USSR's fourth constitution, inciden-
tally, since 1918. 
Our problematic bicentennial claims of constitutional distinction 
may also bear watching in other respects as well. For instance, our con-
stitutional plan of government, with its trichotomy of separated powers 
and alleged checks and balances among the executive, judicial, and legis-
lative departments, is far from unique to the United States. Moreover, 
given the Supreme Court's nearly complete acquiescence in the congres-
sional habit of divesting itself of large blocks of legislative responsibility 13 
2. The following references are taken from the English translation of the Constitution (Fun-
damental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session 
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, Oct. 7, 1977, as published by Novosti Press 
Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1982. 
3. !d. arts. 55, 56. 
4. !d. art. 50. 
5. !d. art. 52. 
6. !d. arts. 49, 58. 
7. !d. art. 54. 
8. !d. arts. 34, 35. 
9. !d. art. 42. 
10. !d. art. 44. 
I I. !d. art. 45. 
12. !d. art. 40. 
13. See. e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 90-91 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ("[t]hese omnibus grants of power allow the Executive Branch to make the law as it chooses 
in violation of [the doctrine of separated powers]"); E. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT 9 (4th ed. 1957) 
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by shifting its obligations and its powers to the President and to in-
dependent administrative agencies (whose laws Congress now cannot 
even disapprove 14), and given the Court's tendency to sustain executive 
law-making to the extent Congress is unwilling or unable to legislate 
against such executive practices, 15 one can in fact question whether the 
actual extent of separated legislative and executive powers is as substan-
tial as the conventional wisdom supposes. 
Similarly, the federalism of our constitution scarcely distinguishes it, 
although we are likely to celebrate this as well. A significant number of 
countries are organized in the same fashion, several, such as Canada, 
Australia, and Switzerland, more credibly than the United States. More-
over, as with the separation of powers, the extent to which our Supreme 
Court has permissively yielded to Congress virtual authority to deter-
mine the extent of Congress's own several powers, has effectively ren-
dered the de facto extent of federalism essentially a matter of 
congressional grace. 16 
Still, blush as one ought in anticipation of the overzealous patriot-
ism the bicentennial is certain to occasion, some features of our constitu-
tion may yet be rightly regarded as noteworthy. And, in fact, I think 
that our constitution does contain three such geniunely noteworthy fea-
tures. Primarily, however, they are not the conventional trinity of feder-
alism, the Bill of Rights, and the separation of powers. Rather, they are 
these three: (1) the judicial power of substantive constitutional review, 
invokeable by ordinary litigants in the course of ordinary litigation; (2) 
the special insulation of article III federal judges in whom much of that 
judicial power is vested, including most importantly the Justices of the 
("that none of the departments may abdicate its powers to either of the others . . . has today almost 
completely disappeared as a viable principle of American constitutional law''); Miller, An Inquiry 
into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the Doc-
trine of Separation of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REv. 583, 600 (1973) ("The problem about Congress is 
simply this: Not only does it not govern, it does not want to govern.") (emphasis in original). See 
also American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 
448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
14. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 459 U.S. 1097 (1983); Process Gas 
Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). 
15. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Haig was critically reviewed in Farber, National 
Security, the Right to Travel, and the Court, 1981 SuP. Cr. REV. 263. See also Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential 
Legislation, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at I; Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and 
Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, 
~~ . 
16. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307-08 
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The concurring opinion said: 
It is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to note that one of the greatest 
"fictions" of our federal system is that the Congress exercises only those powers delegated to it, 
while the remainder are reserved to the States or to the people .... [O]ne could easily get the 
sense from this Court's opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of 
Congress. 
See also Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Perez v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
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Supreme Court; and (3) the deliberately clogged arteries of formal consti-
tutional change, i.e., the limited mechanisms of amendment provided for 
in article V of the Constitution. Together these three measures, each 
quite as valuable as the other two (a "medically-proven combination of 
ingredients," as it were), have given the United States Constitution some 
unusual and even international significance. To the extent that these fea-
tures have fulfilled their original expectations, moreover, they have 
tended to make the Constitution substantially more useful as well. In 
brief, the addition of these three features is what tends to make the other 
features count. 
By far the majority of the world's written constitutions are mere 
precatory or mere political instruments. They reserve their proper inter-
pretation and application to the people, or rather to the people's repre-
sentatives. The people's representatives purport to resolve the issue of 
the consistency of their own actions with the constitution by determining 
that consistency by theoretically not enacting laws inconsistent with the 
constitution and, rather, enacting only such laws as their own correct 
and conclusive understanding of the constitution shows to be consistent 
with that constitution. In this ostensibly satisfactory fashion, their writ-
ten constitution retains a direct connection with a continuing popular 
sovereignty: In all doubtful cases, indeed in all cases, the constitution is 
what the people, meaning their representatives, say it is. Accordingly, 
courts may not permit ordinary litigants to make a subsequent appeal in 
court against such a law (similarly disallowed in the Soviet Union). 17 
The appeal is disallowed on the wholly logical foundation that any con-
stitution established by the people, as that of the USSR or that of the 
United States purports to be, must necessarily commit its own authorita-
tive interpretation to the people's own popularly elected representative-
proxies, rather than to less accountable, or practically unaccountable 
judges. Thus the explanation, for example, of why citizens may not ques-
tion the consistency of the Supreme Soviet's actions with their constitu-
tion. The legislature has already determined that the act is consistent 
with the constitution, and that determination is virtually res judicata, so 
to speak, as far as the courts are concerned. 
Written constitutions so used are not thereby necessarily useless, but 
it is fair to suggest that they are not likely to figure as significantly as 
constitutions that ordinary litigants may also invoke before judges 
charged with an obligation to make a separate determination as re-
quested by the litigant, despite the government's or "the people's" view. 
Moreover, that such written but not justiciable constitutions might 
endure, even over a substantial time, would not be remarkable. Being but 
precatory instruments, to be interpreted quite plastically according to 
17. The Soviet Union does not allow such appeals. For a recent and poignant review, see D. 
KAMINSKAYA, FINAL JuDGMENT (1982). See also Osakwe, The Theories and Realities of Modern 
Soviet Constitutional Law: An Analysis of the 1977 USSR Constitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1350 
(1979). 
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whatever appears best to today's vagrant majority in the national legisla-
ture, these constitutions are kept up-to-date in the same measure that 
they are also interpretatively unreliable. Exactly to the extent that a con-
temporary generation regards the words of a given constitution as but 
empty shells into which it will deposit its own preferences (i.e., its own 
interpretations), the significance of that constitution as so flexibly and 
amiably (mis)construed is diminished. Correspondingly, exactly to the 
extent that our constitution is not similarly malleable, that is, exactly to 
the extent that judges are not bound to any legislature's interpretations 
but rather will apply the Constitution with some earnest degree of 
steadfast consistency, the longevity of our Constitution is remarkable. 
This point is so important that it deserves to be elaborated more 
carefully, to take account of other views as well. A constitution whose 
provisions were determined by people, all of whom are now dead, but 
whose constitutional provisions courts apply to limit the living, seems 
suspect and not right. Unless it can be altered very readily or reinter-
preted, such a constitution seems utterly anomalous. Thomas Jefferson 
regarded a permanent constitution as so irreconcilable with the equal 
right of each generation to resolve its own constitutional preferences, for 
instance, that he seriously proposed to Madison that our Constitution 
should have a maximum date of expiration not in excess of thirty-four 
years from its date of ratification. 18 Had Jefferson's thought been 
adopted, the Constitution of 1789 would literally have expired in 1823. 
Jefferson selected the period of thirty-four years, moreover, quite scientif-
ically; it was the average remaining life expectancy of persons already 
twenty-one years old, the age Jefferson thought marked one's entitlement 
to act for oneself, as an adult. In any event, according to this view every 
constitution should terminate and honorably expressly provide for that 
expiration within thirty-four years, if the members of each subsequent 
generation were to be treated with the same respect for their collective 
sovereignty as Jefferson's generation, the original constitution-making 
generation, had claimed for itself. 
Only by its own positive re-enactment, by fully equivalent majorities 
affirming its provisions each thirty-four years, could the Constitution, or 
any constitution, claim the same legitimacy for that generation as it de-
rived from the consent of the original generation. Indeed, Jefferson 
maintained that only by such positive reenactment could the Constitu-
tion claim any legitimacy beyond thirty-four years: procedures allowing 
for its amendment, even supposing they might be extremely permissive 
procedures, could not suffice as a substitute. "[T]he power of repeal is 
not an equivalent," 19 Jefferson observed, and a moment's thought about 
the matter makes it obvious that he was correct. Inertia carries too artifi-
18. THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 488-93 (A. Koch & W. 
Peden eds. 1972) (letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Paris, Sept. 6, 1789) [hereinafter 
cited as JEFFERSON). 
19. /d. at 492. 
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cial an advantage on its side. Automatic expiration must be provided for 
to insure that the renewed constitution would reflect the same positive 
affirmation as the original. 
The alternative to Jefferson's automatic thirty-four year sunset 
clause cannot be found in any such different and lesser mechanism such 
as some clause or article providing the means of amendment. Certainly, 
one cannot say that the limited means of amendment in article V are 
sufficient. What, then, might be sufficient in lieu of an express termina-
tion clause, or sufficient as a complement to some article providing for 
amendment? 
The obvious candidate is the prerogative of each generation to sub-
stitute its own interpretation of each and every article, clause, and word 
in the Constitution, and utterly without apology for any apparent, or for 
that matter, real incongruity, either with the words or clauses thus 
freshly interpreted or with the interpretations of prior generations. To 
the contrary, any such inconsistencies would mean merely that this gen-
eration has elected interpretatively to enact a different constitution than 
that which the preceding generation found satisfactory, but which, as is 
their equal right, this new generation does not find equally satisfactory. 
One need not dilate this view much more to see the necessary impli-
cation.20 Effectively, this approach eventually comes to the same point 
we have already examined. This result explains why most countries with 
written constitutions have historically had no sense of anomaly in reserv-
ing the question of the correct constitutional interpretation to their most 
popularly representative department, in addition to including a provision 
in the same constitution for rather easy outright amendment. Such inter-
pretations, and not merely such amendments, are then fully binding on 
all other departments. The fact that the Congress of 1985 might read 
commerce in the commerce clause differently than Congress read it in 
1890, or in 1794, or indeed the fact that today's Congress might interpret 
the word commerce as though it said "everything," is all right. This dif-
ference merely means in this way we are taking Jefferson's suggestion 
seriously; each generation is indeed enacting its own constitution. 
The usual academic variation on the arrangement just described is 
to complicate the arrangement by one additional move. This variation 
adopts the notion of the legislature's right to say what the Constitution 
shall be, by reporting each generation's alleged preferences via alleged 
interpretation, subject to a weak form of judicial review. 21 This weak 
20. But see Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 
(1984). 
21. An early, moderate, version of weak review appears even in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The more systematic rationale was developed in Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893). For additional 
elaborations, see W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-11 (1984), 
originally appearing as Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of 
Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209 (1983). This article is meant to be 
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form of judicial review does not allow the judge to determine if the legis-
lative interpretation of a given clause, word, or article is correct in any 
usual sense, however, but only to determine if it is correct in the particu-
lar sense of whether the legislature has accurately reported the current 
generation's preferred interpretation. On this theory, a court should in-
tervene if, but only if, the court concludes that the legislature has misun-
derstood a given generation's preference about something in the 
Constitution. When the court intervenes, of course, its task is not to 
apply the Constitution according to its mere words, their plain meaning, 
or prior understandings based on the Constitution of the dead; the 
court's task is rather to apply the Constitution of the present, that is, the 
Constitution of the current majority will as if this generation were mak-
ing the Constitution anew. On the other hand, if, but only if, the courts 
think that the legislature is out of touch with "the people," in that the 
legislature's view of the preferred new constitutional interpretation does 
not reflect "the people's view" (who presumptively prefer some preexist-
ing interpretation), then only on those occasions shall the courts presume 
to apply the preexisting Constitution to invalidate a legislative act. 22 
Beyond the weak populist view of independent substantive constitu-
tional review, occasionally commentators add a single qualification. And 
although too many contemporary authors claim credit for it, actually 
this qualification was another point which Jefferson had suggested, even 
as a qualification upon his own proposal for an automatically self-expir-
ing thirty-four year constitution. In 1824, thirty-five years after detailing 
his reasons for a self-expiring constitution, Jefferson wrote still again 
about his idea. But, he added a qualification: 
A generation may bind itself as long as its majority continues in 
life; when that has disappeared, another majority is in place, holds 
all the rights and powers their predecessors once held, and may 
change their laws and institutions to suit themselves. Nothing then 
is unchangeable but the inherent unalienable rights of man.23 • 
Jefferson's last sentence is the basis for still another variation of judi-
cial review. According to this view, courts would stringently apply the 
particular provisions, if any, of the original constitution that record and 
protect "inherent unalienable rights." These are rights that in theory 
governments or whole majorities may not properly presume to deny, 
whether or not denying such rights would conform to their constitutional 
preferences. The reason for this exception is the obvious one. Whatever 
constitutes "the inherent" and "unalienable rights of man," by definition 
no government, no constitution, and no majority may abridge. Thus, to 
the extent that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights may have captured 
substantially complementary to that piece. Cf Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective: A Re-
sponse to Professor Van Alstyne, 18 Nw. U.L. REv. 1435 (1984). 
22. See also Ackerman, supra note 20, discussed infra note 51. 
23. JEFFERSON, supra note 18, at 714 (letter to John Cartwright, from Monticello, June 5, 
1824) (emphasis added). 
940 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1984 
some of these sorts of rights, naturally they are not subject to subsequent 
majoritarian tampering at all. In theory, moreover, these rights cannot 
be denied even by the process of amendment provided for in article V of 
the Constitution. Only these rights, however, would be protected endur-
ingly by the strong version of judicial review. As to all the rest of the 
Constitution, naturally just the weak form of review would apply. This 
whole scheme assumes, of course, that the judges can determine which 
rights are the "inherent unalienable" ones. 
Even so, whatever the degree of variation, the point remains the 
same: the real or concrete adjudicative significance of the Constitution is 
almost wholly a function of the extent to which it is not democratized 
and rationalized away. If, as Jefferson suggested, the Constitution would 
literally terminate according to its own terms each thirty-four years, by 
definition it would have had a brief term of possible significance, but no 
longevity. Similarly, constitutions regarded as conveying no power of in-
dependent judicial substantive review may last for a long time, but have 
no particular, nonprecatory significance. This is quite obviously true 
even of the most modem constitution in the Soviet Union. In the middle 
of the continuum between these points, in nations with written constitu-
tions and judicial review, but in nations whose judges genuflect to popu-
lar interpretations, whether of "commerce," of "equal protection," or 
whatever, the constitution's significance is correspondingly an intermedi-
ately weaker or stronger one, depending upon the extent of this judicial 
practice. 
The theoretically available variations are, of course, quite as numer-
ous as the number of available academic sponsors. Their ingenious theo-
ries for various kinds of weaker or stronger judicial review are put 
forward as extremely well-written efforts to reconcile a large number of 
problems merely touched upon here.24 One may nonetheless reserve a 
certain doubt whether their work has really advanced much beyond pro-
viding an excuse for a variety of Supreme Court decisions and interpreta-
tions that highly political judges have simply strongly preferred, and 
which they were quite delighted to be able to deliver in better-looking 
jurisprudential packages. We need not reexamine that question here, 
however, still again. 25 
Although the strong form of substantive judicial constitutional re-
view of which the United States Constitution is normally thought to be 
an example, is invokeable by ordinary litigants, even it may not be of 
great moment if either the decisions or the judges may be readily 
changed. Thus the obviousness of why the combination of the three note-
worthy features of our Constitution, each as indispensable as the other 
two, deserves emphasis. Very few countries imitate the American plan in 
all three respects. Indeed, as already implied, American judges only oc-
24. For discussions and references, see supra note 21. 
25. These matters are discussed more fully infra sections III and IV. 
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casionally fulfill it. Most of those countries that do adhere to a similar 
arrangement only have done so since World War II. Interestingly, West 
Germany is one of these, although not in all respects: the judges of the 
West German constitutional court serve only for a fixed term, for in-
stance, and there are also some differences about the manner in which 
constitutional questions can be raised. Even sb, it is interesting that the 
West Germans have followed the United States example, their resolve to 
do so having arisen from the ashes of the Third Reich. 
Quite apart from the extent of our Constitution's recent influence on 
constitutional developments in other countries, however, it is obvious 
that something must be approximately sound about the existing Ameri-
can arrangement. For nearly two centuries the Constitution has neither 
been overthrown by revolution, nor peacefully displaced as were the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, nor yet so frequently amended as to have made 
its provisions little more than mutable super statutes. That the Constitu-
tion has not been widely imitated may be appropriately sobering. But 
that it evidently still reports approximately the right degree of tension for 
the needs of the United States seems true. Indeed, it seems to be so self-
evident as virtually to imply its own conclusion: Whatever the difficul-
ties of American processes of constitutional change, the evidence is im-
pressive that no radical revisions may be warranted. 
It ought not come as a surprise, therefore, if the most one may pro-
pose in assessing the processes of constitutional change turns out to be 
quite mild. Indeed, the proposals may amount to little more than some 
passing suggestions on the uses of article V. Thus I mean to review 
briefly how article V has appeared to work, and how its workings might 
be helped in some respects without any radical change. Thereafter, I 
compare our other processes of constitutional change with those pro-
vided by article V. And in the end, I venture an observation or two on 
how these several processes may operate during the next century as 
well-assuming we are fortunate enough to have one. The choice as I 
think it may be is between a living constitution and a dead sea scroll. 
II. PROCESSES OF AMENDMENT 
The amendment process has been invoked continuously, but its suc-
cessful use divides into three identifiable parts. Although somewhat in 
excess of five thousand amendments have been proposed in Congress, 26 
only thirty-three have emerged from Congress, and of these the States 
have ratified only twenty-six. Even as to this last modest number, more-
over, the number is somewhat misleading in its implications. On its face, 
it might imply that a significant constitutional change has occurred by 
amendment approximately once each decade-twenty-six divided into 
two hundred years. As is generally well-known, however, the actual uses 
26. See S. REP. No. 724, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). 
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of the amendment process have been more messy. One may more accu-
rately speak of three clumps of amendment, only two of which, more-
over, genuinely postdate the Constitution.27 
The first clump was the group of anti-federalist amendments, the 
first through the eleventh, that responded to much of the original resis-
tance to ratification. All of these except the eleventh were both proposed 
and ratified within a very brief, two-year interval between 1789 and 1791, 
at virtually the same time as the Constitution. The second clump is that 
resulting from the Civil War, and consists of the thirteenth through the 
fifteenth amendments, which were laid in place within a single five-year 
period from 1865 to 1870. Most of the rest of the more recent amend-
ments, other than those which are primarily housekeeping, are not quite 
as neatly grouped sociologically, but can reasonably be seen as populist 
amendments: that which authorizes the graduated income tax (the six-
teenth amendment), the several amendments further spreading the vote 
(the seventeenth on election of senators, the nineteenth on sex, the 
twenty-third on District of Columbia presidential electors, the twenty-
fourth on poll taxes in federal elections, and the twenty-sixth on voting 
for eighteen year olds), and the two amendments constituting our failed 
experiment with populist morality (the eighteenth's enactment of prohi-
bition and its repeal fourteen years later by the twenty-first). 
Actually, if one excludes the Bill of Rights, on the ground that it 
followed so quickly after ratification of the Constitution that it is an inte-
gral part of the original ratification struggle, fundamental constitutional 
change by amendment may have occurred at but one time in American 
history: from 1865 to 1870. These alterations expunged the original 
slave clauses and dislocated from the states, via the thirteenth, four-
teenth, and fifteenth amendments, their former police power to do much 
as they liked with only the provisions in article I, section 10 lightly hem-
ming them in. It may be instructive that the change was the by-product 
of civil war. It was also facilitated by the absence of a substantial part of 
the nation from the Congress which proposed the amendments. Further-
more, ratification was achieved partly under political duress to the extent 
that Congress presumed to determine the "republican" character of cer-
tain states partly by their ratification receptivity to the thirteenth and 
fourteenth amendments. 28 Significant constitutional change by amend-
ment apparently has been confined to two occasions of enormous domes-
tic upheaval: the immediate post-Revolutionary War epoch, and the 
post-Civil War epoch. 
In addition, with respect to change by formal amendment, it is note-
worthy that all of the amendments have originated in but one of the two 
27. For an excellent review, see Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethink-
ing the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 427-30 (1983). 
28. See C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1868, at 509-10 (1971). 
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ways provided for by the Constitution and that none has originated via 
the alternative mode. Specifically, article V provides: 
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem 
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on 
the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, 
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of 
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths 
of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as 
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress .... 
No amendment has ever been proposed by a convention, pursuant to a 
call by Congress, triggered by the applications of two-thirds of the state 
legislatures. Rather, every amendment has originated in Congress. One 
may thus suppose that this alternative method of constitutional change 
has been useless, more quaint than significant-roughly of the same des-
uetude, for instance, as the third amendment in the Bill of Rights, which 
forbids the quartering of troops in private homes during peacetime with-
out the owner's consent. 
This observation is almost but not quite true. The observation may 
need qualification in two respects. First, while the use of the state-called 
convention mechanism has not been successful as such in that no conven-
tion has ever been called, on at least one occasion the mechanism was 
used to prompt Congress to produce a proposed amendment, which the 
states then swiftly ratified, and which Congress may have proposed prin-
cipally in response to state applications for a convention, rather than 
from any interest or desire on its own part for the proposed amendment. 
Such was the particular history of the seventeenth amendment, providing 
for the election of senators. The Senate showed little interest in propos-
ing such an amendment, which would necessarily subject incumbent sen-
ators to new risks because prior to the seventeenth amendment senators 
were chosen by state legislatures rather than by popular vote. Only after 
many states filed applications, making it likely that Congress would be 
obliged to call a convention to propose such an amendment, did Con-
gress moot the question by introducing the amendment itself. 29 
In a more distant but still relevant sense, the same was true of the 
original Bill of Rights. Seven of the states had strongly indicated, in the 
course of ratifying the Constitution, that they firmly expected Congress 
to propose immediately some sort of bill of rights. James Madison's in-
troduction in the first Congress of a proposed Bill of Rights pretermitted 
further efforts by several states to call a convention. Apparently, the 
quickness and ease of getting Congress to agree upon the original Bill of 
29. See R. WAGNER, R. TOLLISON, A. RABRUSHKA & J. NOONAN, BALANCED BUDGETS, 
FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 94 (1982). See a/so 47 CONG. REC. 211 (1911) 
[hereinafter cited Senate Subcommittee Hearing]. 
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Rights may have been influenced by the perceived likelihood that in the 
absence of such congressional initiative a convention would have been 
demanded by the requisite number of state legislative applications. 
Second, that no amendment has yet been proposed by a limited 
called convention may not necessarily reflect any consensus that congres-
sionally proposed changes are the only appropriate means. Rather, ap-
parently such conventions might have been called, on at least a few 
occasions, were it not for certain problems that Congress has not wanted 
to resolve. Its own passiveness in this respect has helped Congress main-
tain its virtual monopoly over the amendment process. The principal 
practical constraint on the use of the state-called convention as a mecha-
nism to propose amendments is the profound fear and uncertainty associ-
ated with its untested use. The uncertainty is probably greater than it 
need be. It is made worse insofar as Congress has never adopted any 
useful guideline legislation to settle a large number of questions.30 
Within the past decade, for instance, a considerable number of state 
legislatures, by one count thirty-two, did apply to Congress to call a con-
stitutional convention to consider various proposals to restrict the deficit 
spending practices of Congress. 31 Informally, these various applications 
sought some sort of budget-balancing amendment modeled roughly on 
several states' constitutional provisions forbidding biennial appropria-
tions in excess of anticipated revenues. The proposals differed from such 
state provisions, however, in permitting a degree of flexibility essential to 
the greater responsibilities of the national government. Not all of the 
state legislative applications were identically framed. Indeed, some ap-
plications were so entirely inconsistent with some other applications that 
Congress most probably could not count them together. 
Be that as it may, in several other state legislatures, such as Califor-
nia, it became obvious that the state's effort to resolve its application 
would fail less from misgivings about some sort of proposed amendment 
than from misgivings about the uncertainties of article V. The uncertain-
ties were emphasized by several constitutional scholars invited to testify 
in opposition to the proposal before the California Assembly. 32 They 
made quite a convincing case. Absent congressional guideline legislation 
which may not be able to resolve every question but which surely can 
30. A summary of failed bills on the subject is provided in the Senate Judiciary Committee's 
most recent Report and proposal, in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1984, S. REP. No. 594, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1984). For 
additional references to the full range of prior hearings and professional reviews on state-called con-
ventions, see Constitutional Convention Procedures, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution 
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 77, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
31. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BALANCED BUDGET-TAX LIMITATION CON-
STITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, S. REP. No. 628, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984). 
32. See, e.g., Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to 
Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979) (reprint of a prepared statement 
delivered to the Committee on Ways and Means of the California State Assembly). But see Noonan, 
The Convention Method of Constitutional Amendment, Its Meaning. Usefulness, and Wisdom, 10 
PAC. L.J. 641 (1979) (revised testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means of the California 
Assembly). See also references cited supra note 30. 
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answer some questions, too many uncertainties seem to exist. Among 
the uncertainties emphasized in the California hearings were these: 
1. whether a limited agenda convention may be called or 
whether any convention, once called, is at once empowered to pro-
pose any amendments to which it might agree; 
2. · whether Congress may decline to submit for ratification 
amendments proposed in excess of a convention's originally limited 
agenda, or whether it must submit whatever the convention 
proposes; 
3. whether states would vote in a convention as states ("one 
state, one vote"), or by individual delegate votes, and if the latter, 
how many delegates would each state have; 
4. how state delegates would be selected, where the conven-
tion would meet, and pursuant to what set of rules shall it conduct 
its business. 
This list of questions is by no means exhaustive. It is quite sufficient, 
however, to make the point that the uncertainty of the state-called con-
vention method to secure even limited changes in the Constitution has 
been a substantial factor in the failure of the process. Congress's reluc-
tance to enact suitable guideline legislation has contributed to the prob-
lem. It is obvious to anyone who· has participated in the congressional 
hearings that some of the resistance does not come merely from a belief 
that such guideline legislation could at best be of limited use. 33 Rather it 
proceeds from a fear of the amendment process itself and from a prefer-
ence to reserve that process solely to Congress and to the courts. 
One additional set of observations may be helpful regarding the ac-
complishment of constitutional change by amendment rather than by ad-
judication. In reexamining article V, we should note that regardless of 
how an amendment is proposed, whether by two-thirds of both houses in 
Congress or by a state-called convention, Congress has the complete dis-
cretion to select either of two methods of submitting proposed amend-
ments for ratification. Congress may either submit a proposed 
amendment to the state legislatures or to the "Conventions in" the states. 
In all but one instance, amendments have undergone the ordeal of the 
state legislature route-most recently, of course, with the proposed 
twenty-seventh amendment, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). That 
amendment fell three states short of the thirty-eight needed for ratifica-
tion, 34 even after ten years, the longest congressionally authorized period 
33. See Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 29, at 292, 298, 301. See also Van Alstyne, 
The Limited Constitutional Convention-The Recurring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985; Van Alstyne, 
Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?-A Letter to a Colleague, 
1978 DUKE L.J. 1295. But see, e.g., Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitu-
tional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979); Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the 
United States Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
34. Memorandum for the Administrator of General Services Suggesting Mootness, at 3-4, Na-
tional Org. for Women, Inc. v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 1032 (1982) (Nos. 81-1282, 81-1283, 81-1312 & 81-
1313). 
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of ratification ever provided. It is not well-known, however, that on one 
occasion Congress did provide for ratification by state conventions-and 
the procedure met with instant success. Such was the particular history 
of the twenty-first amendment. 
The twenty-first amendment, which repealed prohibition, went at 
once from Congress to statewide ballots, in which state convention dele-
gate-candidates sought election. The successful slates convened 
promptly thereafter to ratify the proposed amendment. Professor Dellin-
ger has reviewed extensively the history of that ratification. 35 His re-
search tends to confirm the suggestion that certain kinds of amendments 
may fare better in this process than in that which uses state legislatures. 
If a proposed amendment has very substantial support nationwide, 
congressional submission of the amendment to the convention ratifica-
tion procedure may avoid some of the pitfalls the same amendment 
might encounter in state legislatures and stand an improved chance of 
timely ratification. State legislatures still often meet but once each two 
years. Some states, moreover, such as Illinois, require more than a ma-
jority vote of the whole legislature to accomplish ratification. 36 Opposi-
tion to a proposed amendment by a small minority even of the least 
populous states can suffice to defeat the amendment. If their views are 
shared by even a few securely entrenched committee leaders in but one 
house of a few state legislatures, the amendment may necessarily fail. 
The same handicaps may not apply to an amendment submitted to state 
ratifying conventions. Professor Dellinger has suggested, for instance, 
that given the strong and well distributed support that favored the ERA, 
and the fairly brief time in which state ratifying conventions are elected 
once an amendment has been proposed, had Congress submitted the 
ERA to ratification by convention, rather than to the slower ordeal of 
state legislative sessions, it is entirely likely that the ERA would have 
been ratified.37 Given also that the ERA was originally received quite 
favorably, with ratification going forward very rapidly during the first 
two years and foundering only as the amendment tended to stay around, 
I see no reason to question his interesting conjecture. In any event, this 
much may be reasonably clear: in some instances, the process of consti-
tutional change by amendment might be expeditiously employed insofar 
as Congress, in submitting proposed amendments, might be more canny 
in its discretion to select the convention mode of ratification than the 
more customary, state legislature mode . 
In summary, one can make these few observations about the 
processes of amendment: First, that the Constitution has endured as 
35. Dellinger's summary regarding the ratification of the twenty-first amendment appears in 
Dellinger, Another Route to the ERA, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1982, at 8. He retains the supporting 
research on file at Duke University. 
36. For an interesting review of the Illinois arrangement, see Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 
(N.D. Ill. 1975). 
37. See Dellinger, supra note 35. 
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long as it has, and that it continues to figure very prominently in our 
national life, may strongly suggest that no radical revision of article V is 
either necessary or appropriate to accommodate the changing circum-
stances of the United States. Second, at the same time, one should not 
expect such changes as may be made by amendment to work any funda-
mental revision of the Constitution, except in the most extraordinary or 
virtually calamitous conditions. Third, it is nevertheless feasible to ease 
the course of making changes by amendment even now, insofar as any-
one is interested in doing so. One way to do so is through congressional 
enactment of guideline legislation to reduce the uncertainties of state-
called conventions. Another is by means of more attention within Con-
gress to the alternatives available to it in the choice of ratification proce-
dures. Whether these observations and suggestions are sufficient, 
however, may depend at least partly upon how one feels about our other 
processes of constitutional change-the processes not authorized by arti-
cle V. So, we now turn briefly to these. 
Ill. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
"We are under a Constitution," Charles Evans Hughes declared to 
his Chamber of Commerce audience in Elmira, New York, "but the Con-
stitution is what the judges say it is."38 Hughes's remark is memorable, 
of course, because his choice of words is much more insinuating than 
other ways of describing the judicial task. In Federalist Number 78, for 
instance, Alexander Hamilton also acknowledged and defended the pro-
priety of judicial review. Clearly, however, his careful choice of words 
did not imply the same tone or suggestion that one at once detects in 
Hughes's reiteration. Thus, Federalist Number 78 noted: 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of 
the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the 
judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascer-
tain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act pro-
ceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior 
obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other 
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute. 39 
The Federalist stresses a good faith obligation "to ascertain its meaning," 
emphasizing that the Constitution is to control rather than the judges. 
Hughes stresses "what the judges say," i.e., the thing that in fact controls 
is whatever the judges say the Constitution means, whether what they 
say proceeds from a good-faith effort to ascertain its meaning or whether 
what they say comes from an additional view of their role or of their 
opportunities as judges. 
38. C. HUGHES, Speech Before the £//mira Chamber of Commerce, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 
133, 139 (1908). 
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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The Federalist's rather disarming, even dry description assuredly 
disengages the judiciary from any active role in constitutional change; 
the judges are to give the Constitution no less than its due, despite 
whatever misgivings they might have about the wisdom of certain 
clauses, such as the slave clauses, and no more than its due, despite 
whatever misgivings they might have about the limited reach of certain 
other clauses, such as the due process clause. The Federalist assumes 
that the Supreme Court may be involved in the processes of constitu-
tional change, but only as a catalyst. Insofar as its decisions faithfully 
applying the Constitution might bring to public attention consequences 
of the unamended Constitution that a large enough public would no 
longer approve, its decisions may trigger one or another of the article V 
amendment processes. Fundamental law would thereby be altered, as 
indeed it was thus altered by the eleventh, the fourteenth, and the six-
teenth amendments.40 Emphatically, however, the judges are to leave to 
the processes of article V such alterations as might be thought necessary 
to provide a better Constitution. The judges' decisions may thus signal 
appropriate occasions for constitutional change, but they do not presume 
to make it. 
Much different from this signalling function of the Supreme Court 
in the processes of constitutional change are the many varieties of sub-
stantive judicial activism that have been persistently advanced. Indeed, 
even within the last three years, six new books have renewed the argu-
ment for a more participatory role for the Supreme Court in effecting 
substantive constitutional change.41 And even these recent additions un-
derstate the matter, as they leave out of account a burgeoning law journal 
enthusiasm supportive of that role.42 Significantly, the positions that the 
writers advance in these works are not confined to the suggestion that the 
Supreme Court should take care to apply the Constitution with equal 
firmness to new circumstances as to older, more familiar ones, as for 
example to apply the fourth amendment to warrantless intrusions by 
wiretap the same as to warrantless intrusions by the physical breaking 
down of doors. 43 This kind of application of unamended clauses may 
amount to no more than the firm application of the Constitution, and 
quite compatibly with the expectations of Federalist Number 78. 
Neither are these writers' positions confined to the defensible propo-
40. These amendments respectively alter the Constitution as otherwise interpreted in Chisholm 
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); and 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
41. SeeS. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984); C. BLACK, DECISION AC· 
CORDING TO LAW (1981); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); R. LADENSON, A PHILOSO· 
PHY OF FREE EXPRESSION (1983); A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982); 
M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). 
42. See, e.g., Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585 (1983). 
43. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438 (1928)). The Katz majority adopted the approach of the dissents by Holmes and Brandeis 
in Olmstead. See 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting); 277 U.S. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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sition that the clauses of the Constitution should be interpreted under a 
rule of generous construction, appropriately acknowledging that it is in-
deed a constitution being expounded, within which the enumerations, al-
locations, and limitations of power ought not to be grudgingly regarded 
or narrowly construed.44 Rather, the stronger thesis holds that the 
Supreme Court also has a necessary and proper obligation complemen-
tary to the formal amendment processes of article V. Accordingly, and 
yet allegedly consistent with article V, the Court must act to preserve the 
living Constitution from the hazards of obsolescence by its own innova-
tion of interstitial or incremental quasi-amendments under article III. In 
brief, the national judiciary allegedly has the additional responsibility of 
repairing the gaps of constitutional inadequacy that become quite evi-
dent, but which the nation cannot sensibly expect the more cumbersome 
and less tentative machinery of the formal amendment process to handle. 
To be sure, a large number of conventional arguments concerning 
this subject are not framed in these terms. Rather, they are framed more 
esoterically, in the manner of the arguments examined in the Introduc-
tion,45 to construe the Constitution according to the perceived will of 
"the people." Here, however, the point is a different one than the sugges-
tions considered in the Introduction. It is not that the courts should 
adjust their interpretations of the Constitution to conform to some al-
leged contemporary popular preference. Rather, it is that the courts are 
institutionally best situated to measure the need for constitutional revi-
sions, and thus, within reasonable limits, to make such revisions directly. 
Thus, by pressing the full advantage of Chief Justice Hughes's ob-
servation, the judicial power arising under article III of the Constitution 
may also include a power incidental to the processes of constitutional 
change provided for in article V. This incidental power is, moreover, 
allegedly not adverse to article V, but rather it allegedly complements 
article V. The difficult combination of prerequisite extraordinary majori-
ties demanded for formal article V amendments is, in this view, not ob-
jectionable. To the contrary, it is entirely defensible as a proper 
protection of the Constitution from the risks of captious alteration 
which, if not restrained, might well trivialize the Constitution as a source 
of "fundamental" law. For example, the ease of amending the California 
Constitution by simple majority referenda may have tended to trivialize 
large portions of that state's constitution. 
The heavy machinery of article V, one may thus believe, has worked 
reasonably well, and accordingly that machinery ought not be tampered 
with now. But the desirable rigor of article V necessarily tends to 
threaten a rigor mortis for the entire Constitution, if the Supreme Court 
44. The reference, of course, is to Marshall's familiar phrase from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,406-07 (1819). See also Holmes's able reiteration in Missouri v. Holland, 252 
u.s. 416, 432-35 (1920). 
45. See supra text immediately preceding and accompanying notes 17-22. 
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ignores its own supposed institutional obligation of tentative and retracta-
ble quasi-amendment. 
Accomplished with care and with studied restraint, the Supreme 
Court's implied judicial power of interstitial and retractable quasi-
amendment helps safeguard the contemporaneity of the Constitution. 
The Court presumably does not take large leaps as a formal amendment 
might, but rather makes only fairly small, incremental adjustments, prin-
cipally at the margins of ambiguous clauses. This Court process is far 
superior to the formal amendment process in this regard, moreover, be-
cause insofar as later events may be persuasive that a particular constitu-
tional innovation by the Court was not as well-advised as circumstances 
originally suggested, the quasi-amendment may be retracted by the same 
process that called it into being; neither the innovation nor its elimina-
tion is subjected to the heavy machinery of article V. Thus, just as the 
decision in Lochner v. New York46 may illustrate the downside risks of a 
power of interstitial judicial innovation, unlike the prohibition amend-
ment it did not require any later amendment to cancel the experiment; in 
fact, the Court effectively overruled Lochner a mere twelve years later.47 
And similarly, neither are such judicial quasi-amendments as those enun-
ciated in Mapp v. Ohio,48 importing the exclusionary rule into the four-
teenth amendment, nor in Roe v. Wade, 49 declaring a limited abortion 
right, beyond retraction. To whatever extent each may be regarded as 
more amendment than interpretation, we recognize even now that each is 
extremely vulnerable to repeal by the same agency which introduced 
them. Indeed, it is exactly our shared recognition of that possibility 
which accounts for the political struggle to command who shall next be 
appointed to the Supreme Court. 
In sum, there is in this view allegedly a desirable duality of two, 
neatly-fitted mechanisms for constitutional change. Both are provided 
for within the Constitution: the molar machinery of article V, heavy, 
formal, and required for any outright modifications in the written text of 
the Constitution; and the molecular machinery of article III, lighter, 
more insulated, and appropriate for incremental and retractable judicial 
innovation. Allied with the latter, moreover, may also be an additional 
and companionate role associated with Congress, a participating legisla-
tive implication arising from article I. The thought shaped in certain 
cases 5° is that an extension of some existing clause that may seem doubt-
ful for the Supreme Court to provide as a quasi-amendment may none-
theless be adopted by the Court if first commended in some congressional 
46. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner more or less "amended" the fourteenth amendment to enact 
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. But see !98 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
47. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
48. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
49. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
50. E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409 (1968); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (dicta); United States v. Guest, 383 
U.S. 745 (1966) (dicta). 
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action. The Introduction,51 however, adequately developed the rational-
ized foundation for this species of collaborative quasi-amendment, and it 
need not be reviewed here still again. Essentially, the quasi-amendment 
reintroduces "the people's" will, operating supposedly through Congress, 
to enlarge the Constitution as Congress likes. 
IV. CAMBRIAN RINGS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
The preceding sketch of the principal processes of constitutional 
change now seems reasonably complete and, quite possibly, reassuring as 
well. Running it through from back to front, this is what we appear to 
have: First, there are interstitial quasi-amendments, occasionally intro-
duced, and occasionally also withdrawn through the Supreme Court, al-
51. See supra notes 16, 20, 21, 24 and accompanying text. This earlier discussion developed 
the rationalized foundation for this species of collaborative quasi-amendment. 
A recent hybrid species of amendment has been proposed in Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: 
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). Its labored ingenuity is a tribute to its 
author's resolve to invent a connection between article V and substantive changes that are not pro-
posed and ratified as express amendments, but which Professor Ackerman nonetheless regards as 
sufficient for the Supreme Court to treat as though they were. 
Professor Ackerman's proposal is to have the courts treat the word convention, as it appears in 
article V, as not limited to that which article V expressly describes. Rather, he proposes that courts 
should regard the mass of American citizens at large as a continuing convention whose manifest 
preference for some major alteration in the Constitution may become effective as an amendment. 
Such an amendment occurs "during rare periods of heightened political consciousness," id. at 1022, 
in which "the mass of American citizens mobilizes itself in a collective effort to renew and redefine 
the public good." /d. at 1029. See also id. at 1026-30, 1046, 1057. 
Crisply restated, Professor Ackerman proposes that courts interpret article V as though it were 
accompanied by an additional (phantom) section. As thus (re)written, article V would then provide 
in full: 
Section 1. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose amendments, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several 
states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to 
all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-
fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided, . . . that no state, without its 
consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate. 
Section 2. A "convention for proposing amendments" shall also be deemed to have been 
called, and ratifications of its resolves shall be deemed to have occurred, whenever the mass of 
American citizens, acting during rare periods of heightened political consciousness, has mobil-
ized itself in a collective effort to renew and redefine the public good. 
See id. at 1022, 1026-30, 1046, 1057. 
Professor Ackerman suggests that the Supreme Court's acquiescence in New Deal legislation is 
a concrete example of his discovery of a proper understanding of article V. He declares that the 
Supreme Court acted improperly in purporting to sustain that legislation pursuant to the existing 
commerce, and necessary and proper clauses in article I. In his view, the contested acts of Congress 
were not within the scope of those clauses. He suggests, however, that the Court would have acted 
properly had it declared, instead, that the acts were valid pursuant to the structural nonamendment 
obviously desired and effectively enacted by the mass nonconvention under article V. The Court 
would then have explained that convention includes the extended definition suggested by Ackerman 
and that the amendment thus both proposed and ratified had modified the Constitution by adding a 
new and general welfare power as an unenumerated power vested in Congress and in the President. 
See id. at 1056-57, 1064-65. 
Professor Ackerman maintains his discovery of the (unprovided for) extended convention in 
article V is the genuine article; he derides those inclined to find it remarkable as but "formalists," a 
dismissive term intentionally synonymous, no doubt, for the picayune and small-minded. /d. at 
1059-1070. 
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beit somewhat thinly disguised as but activist interpretations of existing 
clauses, and not usually acknowledged as actual amendments. 
Second, Congress or the President has initiated significant de facto 
alterations. One example is the development of a virtual national police 
power in partial derogation of the tenth amendment. Another is the de-
velopment of considerable government regulation through agency 
rulemaking, in partial derogation of the article I assumption that when 
laws are made they shall be made by Congress. One further example is 
the development of exceptional executive prerogative in partial deroga-
tion of the more modest assumptions of article II. The Supreme Court 
has acquiesced in these changes, albeit also thinly disguised as interpreta-
tions of existing clauses, and not acknowledged as actual amendments 
either. 
Third, occasionally we have approved outright amendments pursu-
ant to article V, most of which may have constituted reasonable improve-
ments reflecting a modified national consensus on certain matters. In the 
aggregate such amendments have been neither so numerous as to clutter 
or degrade the Constitution, nor so few as to suggest that we have been 
ruled by a Constitution desired solely by persons long since dead, and 
virtually unalterable by the living. 
Finally, we have a Constitution which, while still not widely imi-
tated elsewhere, nonetheless is surprisingly resilient in respect to its do-
mestic significance two hundred years after its original novelty. 
One might sensibly conclude, therefore, that the three processes of 
constitutional change are appropriate, felicitous, and sound for the future 
as well. To be sure, two of them apparently grew up outside the rules of 
the Constitution, because they are not provided for in article V, which 
seems to provide expressly and thus exclusively how constitutional 
change shall be accomplished. But such events are not unfamiliar in the 
life of the law. They may amount to no more than a confirmation of 
Holmes's observation-that the life of the law, in this particular instance 
of the Constitution, has been experience and not merely logic. 52 
Similarly, the review of the tripartite processes of change may reflect 
a more mature description of our Constitution. This description, far from 
being embarrassing, is arguably quite creditable. It may furnish in its 
own limited fashion an external set of insights of the same sort Alexis de 
Tocqueville provided so admirably more than a century ago, on a vastly 
more magnificent scale. In Democracy in America, 53 Tocqueville, as a 
visitor, appraised American institutions unconstrained by the American 
conventional wisdom. What he said did not conform to nativist descrip-
tions that did not account for things as he saw them. But by providing 
his own descriptions, Tocqueville did America no disservice, and indeed 
he returned to France with a flattering enthusiasm for this country. 
52. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW I (1881). 
53. A. DE TOCQUEVJLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1835, 1840 (A. Knopf ed. 1945). 
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One need not, therefore, be defensive about our several processes of 
constitutional change, even if two of them seem somewhat lawless and in 
some respects ironic. One might have anticipated that the formal, re-
corded amendments would have marked major alterations in our Consti-
tution, for instance, even assuming that minor, interpretative alterations 
would proceed by other means. With the exception of the Civil War 
amendments, however, quite the reverse appears to be true. The major-
ity of amendments since 1791 have been less significant, in all likelihood, 
than the combination of quasi-amendments simply forced by the 
Supreme Court and the alterations presumed by congressional and exec-
utive fiat, and then approved by judicial winking after the fact. But what 
of that? What does it matter, assuming one feels gratified with the over-
all results? Is it not quite sufficient that the system has given us a Consti-
tution which in fact seems well worth its own bicentennial celebration? 
A small marginal lawlessness seems to be a very fair price. 
I suppose this view we have been examining may well be entirely 
correct. To conclude on any different note, moreover, may seem disfig-
uring. Still, even assuming that we should have more pride and more 
confidence in the way things have worked, there are some regrets and 
reservations that one can hardly fail to acknowledge. My own principal 
reservation can best· be explained in the following way. 
It has seemed to me for a long time that the one fairest way of test-
ing the enthusiasm exhibited by many commentators on the Constitution 
is to imagine the figurative constitutionalizing of their own suggestions. 
The proposal is to take each author's good idea and to reexamine it as 
though it were already a clear and an established feature of the Constitu-
tion. One may feature it within article V, or add it onto article III if it is 
meant as a directive to judges. Or one may place it among the enumer-
ated powers of Congress, insofar as the proposal means to commit to 
Congress an enumerated authority to extend its own powers. Whatever 
the argument, try it not merely as a piece of advocacy urged upon one's 
colleagues, the judges, or on Congress. Try it at least as a figurative draft 
one may need to provide for one's own ideas, to see more clearly how 
each then appears. 54 
The point of this figurative exercise is not meant as a trick. It is not 
to imply that the idea under review should not be credited unless or until 
it is recast as a proposed actual text within the Constitution. The pur-
pose is simply to ask that one carry the enthusiasm of one's advocacy to 
that figurative exercise, even as if one had sole sufficient authority to do 
so. The point is to see how the idea looks when it must be confronted as 
though it were, indeed, an express, authorized mode of constitutional al-
teration, enlargement, diminution, or change. How, then, would others 
frankly regard the proposal? How well would the proponent regard it? 
With what degree of confidence does one imagine that a majority of the 
54. See, e.g., supra note 51. 
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living would welcome it as a necessary and proper feature of their 
constitution? 
My own impression is that nearly all of the offered "insights" about 
the conscious changing of the Constitution without the formalities of ar-
ticle V will at once fail this figurative test. They will do so, moreover, 
because their own authors may not quite trust in them generally, but 
only selectively, only when applied sometimes, by some judges, by some 
Congresses, by some people with sympathies similar to their own. One 
may desire a more democratically driven Constitution, but perhaps only 
if what it would yield would be better from the particular set of prefer-
ences such as an author's strong preference for more generous welfare 
laws, but not for more stringent anti-abortion laws or death penalty laws. 
One may also desire a more judicially driven Constitution, but perhaps 
only if it would deliver a more powerful version of the equal protection 
clause, rather than, say, a more powerful version of the impairment of 
obligations of contracts clause. 
If one were to take the supposedly proper power of judicial quasi-
amendment out from the mere shadows of article III and give it equal 
textual dignity and respect as the Constitution provides in article V, how 
likely is it even a simple majority of citizens would feel benefited? How 
many would regard it favorably? Or, if we pretended for a moment that 
we lived under Jefferson's automatically self-expiring constitution, which 
of the several means of providing for constitutional change now would 
we want to provide? Jefferson's own provision that the Constitution ter-
minate thirty-four years from now? The Bruce Ackerman version of ar-
ticle V? Some intermediate proposal such as "all parts of the 
Constitution save those concerned with inherent and unalienable rights 
are subject to such altered application as Congress shall provide?" All of 
these? None of these? 
But if one would not welcome the appearance of these formulations 
as expressly additional to (or as substitutes for) article V, what does that 
suggest? One may wriggle about the question in many ways, no doubt, 
but what it most obviously suggests is a serious ambivalence at best. 
Each suggestion carries its own troubles and its own baggage, even as 
article V already possesses its own troubles and carries its own baggage. 
Enthusiasm is quickly tempered when thus tested. Better not to recog-
nize these other proposals in the formal Constitution. Best simply to 
urge them as strategies, from time to time, and otherwise reserve the 
usual right to condemn the judges when they are obviously tampering 
with the Constitution, that is, of course, the Constitution of one's own 
preference. If, moreover, no contemporary majority would vote their 
approval of any of these proposals in their constitution (the constitution 
of the living and not merely of the dead), none of these proposals may 
find support on the errant notion that each generation is entitled to settle 
its own rules; clearly the living may not, in fact, welcome these kinds of 
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rule changes in their constitution. They may strongly prefer that the 
judges respect the rules already laid down. 
Nearly everyone is familiar with the adage that "hypocrisy is the 
tribute that vice pays to virtue." Few, however, appreciate its full sub-
tlety. At the point when one shifts from a de Tocqueville position of 
merely offering detached observation as to how the several processes of 
constitutional change actually operate, to the different position of ap-
plause leader or sponsoring theorist, that homily should be recalled. 
There are places in our law which are deliberately hypocritical, and 
perhaps it is for the best. 55 Our deviant processes of constitutional 
change are, at best, very probably of this sort. Americans may each per-
sonally benefit from their occasional de facto exercise, yet we are under-
standably reluctant to regularize them or to grant them a conventional 
legitimacy. Rather, there is a sense in which it is desirable that these 
processes be used only hypocritically, if at all. Honesty would not neces-
sarily be the best policy, for its own hubris might so thoroughly discredit 
the amenities of article V as to alter the very nature and stability of con-
stitutional law. 
In brief, one can make a strong case at least to preserve the forms 
and require the minimum price of self-conscious courtesy. When Con-
gress or the Supreme Court Justices knowingly presume effectively to 
rewrite a clause, an article, or an amendment to the Constitution, the 
least they must do is to have the civility to deny it. Their insistence that 
they are in no respect presuming to amend the Constitution is the mini-
mum tribute they owe the written Constitution at precisely those times 
when they are quite consciously doing exactly what they disclaim. 
Nevertheless, given this complicated and highly ambivalent compro-
mise, there are at least two additional difficulties. The first, by far the 
minor of the two, is the usual first casualty of truth. It is the marginal 
cost of professional disaffection. It is one thing to take the Supreme 
Court seriously, for instance, even when the substance of one's analysis 
of a case or of an opinion is extremely critical. Indeed, to treat a 
Supreme Court opinion critically, as to spend many hours on any task, is 
implicitly a high form of respect. It is quite a different thing, however, to 
review what the Court does, to quarrel with one feature, amplify another, 
commend still another, and so forth, insofar as the entire enterprise is 
accompanied by a profound sense of irrelevance. When one's own sense 
of professional commitment seems betrayed, as it may when the Court 
apparently does not take doctrine seriously, but resolves instead to tor-
ture it, to misconstrue it, and to manipulate it as the mere form of genu-
flection the Court thinks smiling vice owes to virtue, to treat the Court's 
explanations of its cases seriously becomes a professional act of complic-
ity. The result tends to be that the more caring critics, the more serious 
55. For an exceptionally thoughtful discussion and illustration, see M. KADISH & S. KADISH, 
DISCRETION TO DISOBEY (1973). 
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people, are driven out. Gresham's law operates in scholarly disciplines 
as predictably as in monetary systems. 56 
In addition and with this observation I mean to close, one must con-
sider another cost, namely, the prospect of a gradual petrification of the 
written Constitution. As we celebrate the bicentennial, we should also 
take care to anticipate the future and not merely commemorate the past. 
As the present becomes the past, unless we take article V more seriously, 
using it as well as respecting it, the tricentennial is quite likely to possess 
a certain quaintness that even the pending bicentennial does not have: 
the celebration of a great relic, the petrified Constitution of the United 
States. 
Amendments to the Constitution are in some sense like cambrian 
rings. They are its best evidence of life and of continuing growth. They 
mark and record visible passages. Here the eleventh amendment marks 
the reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia;51 over there, the nineteenth amend-
ment declares the equal right of women to vote; "look here," at the six-
teenth and seventeenth amendments, in which first the resolve to 
authorize unapportioned income taxes appears, and then the direct, pop-
ular election of senators. See where a cambrian ring dates the oddity of 
forbidding virtually all uses of "intoxicating liquors," in 1919, in the 
eighteenth amendment. Note where it evidently was reconsidered, in 
1933. See where the Americans quite recently decided to enfranchise 
even their teenagers, in 1971. These are the cambrian rings of a living 
constitution. 
Famous case names are not cambrian rings. They are at best 
rabbinical annotations on a dead sea scroll. Reed v. Reed, 58 for instance, 
has no equivalent status as the ill-fated Equal Rights Amendment would 
have possessed. At best, Reed marks an enlightened innovation gently 
forced by a particular hierarchy, and since then tentatively confirmed by 
a rush of guilt-laden legislative reinforcement. But evidently no sufficient 
enthusiasm exists in the United States to fix as an express part of its 
Constitution that "equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."59 
Not the least reason for that reluctance-the reluctance to add to 
the written Constitution-is an acquired ambivalence toward our own 
56. For a recent and striking example of such disaffection, see Nowak, Resurrecting Realist 
Jurisprudence: The Political Bias of Burger Court Justices, 17 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 549 (1983). See 
also Kurland, Is the Constitution Dead, Too?, U. CHI. MAG., Winter 1984, at 28. 
57. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), as discussed supra note 29. 
58. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding invalid a state statute using a male-preference "tie breaker" for 
court appointment as executor). The case is noteworthy, of course, as the first to shift the equal 
protection standard away from the century-old conventional standard regarding gender. Cf Hoyt v. 
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). The reasoning in Reed was 
saved from disrepute through the creative grace of Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972). 
59. Congress proposed the Equal Rights Amendment as the twenty-seventh amendment on 
March 22, 1972, and the extended ratification deadline expired on June 30, 1982. The amendment 
would have provided: 
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rabbis. Having noticed how very artfully existing clauses have been in-
terpreted, one has a peculiar resistance to proposals that may provide 
highly uncertain careers of their own. The addition of any new cambrian 
ring is thus made more problematic. 
Similarly, not the least reason for the failure of the proposed twenty-
seventh amendment resulted from equivalent mistrust of its enabling 
clause, the provision vesting in Congress a power to enforce it by "appro-
priate" legislation. 60 The fear of congressional capture, and the conjec-
ture that the Supreme Court would too readily acquiesce in such uses as 
Congress might presume to make of its new authority, were substantial. 
In effect it was not that the amendment was necessarily unacceptable. It 
was, rather, that the foundation for trust in its merely fair and moderate 
administration was missing. At the end this consideration, more than 
any other, meant there would be no "cambrian ring" taking governmen-
tal gender discrimination from the shadows of the fourteenth 
amendment. 61 
The amendment process has been made much more difficult than 
the barriers of its own formalities, partly because of the self-fulfilling im-
peratives of the other processes of constitutional change. Their own vir-
tual normalization tends to displace the usefulness of article V. 
Ironically, however, the written Constitution thus begins to recede from 
the living. It is less democratic on its face as it becomes layered in ab-
struse constructions. 
One may be appropriately philosophical about these matters and, 
even so, feel a !iense of loss. No one in this generation may have the 
vision to foresee the alterations appropriately called for in the living Con-
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sion of this article. 
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification. 
60. Jd. § 2. 
61. There were, of course, many contributing factors. Among them, I would include all of the 
following: (I) The Civil War syndrome, as evidenced by the fact that the majority of nonratifying 
states were in the South, where resistance to the ratification of amendments enlarging national pow-
ers has traditionally been strong; (2) the unexpected strength of the sex role tradition; (3) the undue 
complacency of the original proponents, whose explanations of the amendment offered at the time of 
its proposal in Congress were quite cavalier and came around to embarrass the sponsors; (4) tactical 
oversights in Congress, such as using "sex" rather than "gender," and failing to consider ratification 
by state conventions; (5) the 1980 shift in the control of the Republican Party, with the conservatives 
prevailing and the party platform omitting approval of the ERA; (6) the alienating novelty of the 
ratification deadline extension that provided three additional years after the earlier provision for 
seven years; (7) the relatively late start in organized efforts by proponents and the well organized 
efforts by opponents; (8) the alienating effect of additional groups hoping to benefit from ratification, 
such as homophile groups; (9) the displacement effects of supervening post-Reed Supreme Court 
decisions, enlarging the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment to reach nearly all gender-based 
laws, undercutting the perceived importance of the ERA; (10) mistrust of the Supreme Court and of 
Congress about possible uses and (mis)applications of the proposed amendment. 
At the end, in at least three very close states-Illinois, North Carolina, and Florida-the com-
bination of items 3, 9, and 10 proved impossible to overcome. Cj Rhode, Equal Rights in Retro-
spect, I LAW & INEQUALITY I (1983). 
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stitution during the next century, but it is surely unlikely that the right 
answer is "none at all." The revivification of the amendment process, 
like the revival of the Equal Rights Amendment, may require more confi-
dence in the people and less paternalism in the courts. The processes of 
change need not be so strained. 
